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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
lsaac James Cantrell was convicted of trafficking in marijuana and the district 
court imposed a one year fixed sentence upon him.' On appeal, Mr. Cantrell 
challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained 
following his DUI arrest. Specifically, his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution were violated when his vehicle was searched incident to his 
arrest. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (April 21, 2009) (modifying New York v. 
Belfon, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) and holding that "Police may search the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupants arrest only if it is reasonable to 
believe that the arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the 
vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the arrest.") 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
At approximately 2:22 a.m. on Sunday January 28, 2008, Officer Erik Johnson 
stopped a "Honda-type car" traveling the wrong direction on a one-way street in Boise, 
Idaho. (Tr., p.30, L.l - p.35, L.4.) Hearing the call on his police radio, Officer Tony 
White proceeded to the location to assist Officer Johnson. (Tr., p.31, L.20 - p.32, L.22.) 
Isaac Cantrell was identified as the driver of the vehicle and there were three 
passengers in Mr. Cantrell's vehicle. (Tr., p.34, Ls.10-23.) Officer White made contact 
with Mr. Cantrell and performed field sobriety testing upon him. (Tr., p.34, L.9 - p.41, 
L.21.) Based on his observations and Mr. Cantrell's performance on the field sobriety 
testing, Officer White arrested Mr. Cantrell for suspicion of misdemeanor DUI. 
(Tr., p.42, L.19 - p.45, L . l l . )  Officer White placed Mr. Cantrell in handcuffs, secured 
him in his patrol car, and then "asked Officer Johnson to call for a tow." (Tr., p.44, L.19 
- p.45, L. l l .)  While Mr. Cantrell was handcuffed and secured in the patrol car, Officer 
White then proceeded to "search[] the vehicle incident to arrest." (Tr., p.45, Ls.12-14.) 
Before Officer White conducted a search of Mr. Cantrell's vehicle, Officer 
Johnson removed the other occupants of the vehicle and started "dealing with them." 
(Tr., p.49, Ls.11-22.) During his search of the vehicle, Officer White uncovered a 
"Tuppeware-type container underneath the driver's seat." (Tr., p.50, Ls.1-I I .) Officer 
White then opened the container and found "four individually-wrapped sandwich 
baggies with a green leafy substance inside." (Tr., p.50, Ls.6-17.) Officer White 
returned to his patrol car, read Mr. Cantrell his ~iranda'  rights, and asked Mr. Cantrell, 
"tell me what I found inside the vehicle." (Tr., p.51, Ls.3-25.) Mr. Cantrell replied, "a 
bong."3 (Tr., p.52, L.52.) After further open ended questioning, Mr. Cantrell told Officer 
White that the bong was found "in the trunk and that there was other paraphernalia in 
the vehicle. (Tr., p.52, Ls.1-12.) Officer White then continued searching the vehicle, 
opened up the trunk, and testified that he "could immediately smell the strong odor of 
marijuana. . . ." (Tr., p.53, Ls.15-22.) Officer White located a large green military 
shoulder bag, opened it up, and observed a larger quantity of what he believed was 
marijuana. (Tr., p.15, L.15-p.54, L.1.) 
Mr. Cantrell was also convicted of misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol 
$hereinafter, DUI). Mr. Cantrell does not challenge that conviction in the instant appeal. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1 966). 
A bong is a water pipe used for smoking marijuana or tobacco. 
Mr. Cantrell was charged by Information with trafficking in marijuana and 
misdemeanor DUI. (R., pp.25-26.) Defense counsel for Mr. Cantrell filed a motion to 
suppress, wherein he argued, along with other claims, that the district court should 
suppress the fruits of Officer White's warrantless search of Mr. Cantrell's vehicle, 
incident to arrest. (R., pp.36-37; Memorandum, pp.3-8; Reply Memorandum, pp.3-7.)4 
Mr. Cantrell asked that the district court limit the application of 5elfon5 to the specific 
facts of that case and requested that the district court follow the concurring opinions in 
Thornfon v. United Sfafes, 541 U.S. 615, 620, 631 (2004), wherein Justice Scalia 
concluded that the Belfon vehicle search incident to arrest rule should be limited "to 
cases where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be 
found in the vehicle." Id. at 631; (Memorandum, p.7.) In his Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Suppress, Mr. Cantrell informed the district court that the United 
States Supreme Court had recently accepted review in Gant, to determine the 
constitutionality of the Belfon search incident to arrest doctrine. (Reply Memorandum, 
pp.4-6.) 
After a hearing, the district court entered an order denying Mr. Cantrell's motion 
to suppress. (R., pp.87-96.) The district court held that Officer White's search of 
Mr. Cantreli's vehicle was justified under the Belton search incident to arrest rule. 
(R., pp.6-7.) Alternatively, the district court applied that inevitable discovery doctrine, 
Mr. Cantrell's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress and Request for Leave 
to File Supplemental Briefing and to Extend Time for Brief is cited herein as 
"Memorandum." Mr. Cantrell's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress is 
cited herein as "Reply Memorandum." 
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
concluding that the marijuana would have inevitably been discovered "as part of the 
impounding process." (R., p.9.) 
Mr. Cantrell proceeded to trial and was convicted of trafficking in marijuana and 
misdemeanor DUI. (R., pp.87-114.) The district court imposed a one-year fixed 
sentence for the trafficking in marijuana conviction, and two years of unsupervised 
probation for the misdemeanor DUI conviction. (R., pp.131-135.) Mr. Cantrell filed a 
Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment and Commitment. 
(R., pp.135-138.) 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Cantrell's motion to suppress? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Denvina Mr. Cantrell's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
In denying Mr. Cantrell's motion to suppress, the district court held that Officer 
White's search of Mr. Cantrell's vehicle was a permissible search incident to arrest 
under Belton, and, alternatively, the marijuana would have inevitably been discovered 
during an inventory search of the vehicle after it was impounded. In light of Arizona v. 
Ganf, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (April 21, 2009), Mr. Cantrell asserts that his rights pursuant to the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated when Officer White 
conducted a warrantless search of his vehicle. Additionally, the State did not meet its 
burden to prove that the suspected marijuana would have been inevitably discovered as 
the State failed to offer evidence that the impoundment or any subsequent inventory of 
his vehicle was reasonable. 
B. The District Court Erred In Denvina Mr. Cantrell's Motion To Su~press 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." Sfate v. Holland, 
135 Idaho 159, 161, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169 (2000). When a decision on a motion to 
suppress is challenged, the appellate court should "accept the trial court's findings of 
fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely review the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found." Id. 
1 The District Court Erred In Failinq To Admit Into Evidence Durinq The 
Suppression Hearing Four Police Reports Offered By Mr. Cantrell Wherein 
Officers From The Boise Police Department Did Not Impound Vehicles 
Upon Arrestinq A Party For DUI In Situations Where The Where The 
Defendant's Blood Alcohol Content Exceeded . I5  
In denying Mr. Cantrell's motion to suppress, the district court held that because 
Officer White made the decision to impound Mr. Cantrell's vehicle, following his arrest 
for suspected DUI, the marijuana found in his vehicle would have been inevitably 
discovered by officers during an inventory search. (R., p.95.) During the preliminary 
hearing, Officer Cantrell testified as to the Boise Police Departments' purported policy 
relating to the impounding of vehicles where the driver is arrested for suspected DUI. 
Officer White testified that the department's impoundment policy is a "policy that's in 
transition right now of being written." (Tr., p.45, Ls.12-21.) Officer White continued: 
The direction that we have been given is if a driver has been arrested for a 
DUI, that we impound the vehicle with some guidelines. If you felt that the 
driver was from, what I understand, close, that we would leave the vehicle 
placed at the time of the stop, but other than that, we would impound the 
vehicle for public safety, as well as for protection of the department. 
(Tr., p.46, Ls.6-14.) Officer White then clarified the term "close" as "[bleing close to the 
alcohol limit." (Tr., p.46, Ls.15-18.) Later, defense counsel questioned Officer White 
about the later statement and his definition of "close." (Tr., p.74, L.21 - p.75, L.24.) 
Officer White stated: 
Illegal per se is a .08, so you feel if the BAC is close to that, being there is 
a possibility that the breath test results would not concur with what we feel 
in the field, then our direction from our sergeant at that point is they did not 
want us to tow. 
(Tr., p.75, L.25 - p.76, L.5.) Defense counsel then asked Officer White whether it was 
true that individuals with alcohol levels between . I6 and .20 did not have their vehicles 
towed, and Officer White replied, "Not by me." (Tr., p.76, Ls.6-10.) At that point, 
defense counsel attempted to show police reports from the Boise Police Department for 
four cases where the department did not tow the vehicle's where the suspects tested 
above . I5  blood alcohol content. (Tr., p.76, L . l l  - p.77, L.13.) As an offer of proof, 
defense counsel stated, "I would offer them simply to establish the proposition that there 
is not a uniform policy within the Boise Police Department of impounding every vehicle 
in which a person is arrested for DUI." (Tr., p.77, Ls.16-22.) The district court did not 
allow any further questioning on, or introduction into evidence of those documents, 
because they did not involve Officer White. (Tr., p.77, Ls.1-23.) 
Mr. Cantrell asserts that the district court erred in not allowing defense counsel to 
introduce evidence of the lack of a uniform policy with regard to Boise Police 
Department's impounding vehicles in those cases dealing with DUI arrests. Because 
the determination of relevancy is a question of law, an appellate court's standard of 
review on issues of relevance is de novo. Stafe v. Lamphere, 130 ldaho 630, 632, 945 
P.2d 1, 3 (1996) (citation omitted). If the court finds that the evidence is relevant and 
material as to an issue of fact, the court must then determine whether the possible 
prejudice that might inure to the defendant by admission of the evidence is outweighed 
by its probative value. I.R.E. 403; State v. Enno, 119 ldaho 392, 807 P.2d 610 (1991). 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. 
As will be discussed in greater detail below, in this case, because the challenged 
evidence was derived from a warrantless search, the State has the burden to prove that 
the search fell within one of the recognized exceptions to the search warrant 
requirement or was reasonable under the circumstances. See State v. Marfinez, 129 
Idaho 426, 431, 925 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Ct. App. 1996) ("Warrantless searches are 
presumptively unreasonable and the State bears the burden to demonstrate that a 
warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances.") The State was 
attempting to justify the warrantless search as a permissible vehicle inventory following 
the officer's decision to impound the vehicle. 
In Colorado v. Berfine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), the United States Supreme Court 
observed that an officer may exercise police discretion in determining whether to 
impound a vehicle "so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria 
and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity." Id. 
at 375. Thus, evidence that the Boise Police Department did not have standard criteria 
or uniformly follow standard criteria is directly relevant to the issues presented in the 
case. The district court's conclusion that because Officer White was not the arresting 
officer in those cases where vehicles were not impounded misses what is at issue in the 
case. The question is not how Officer White has acted in the past, but whether the 
department had developed a standard criteria and whether whatever criteria was 
established is uniformly followed. Accordingly, because past practices by members of 
the department in deciding to impound vehicles is relevant to determine whether 
standard criteria existed and was uniformly followed, the district court erred in failing to 
admit the offered evidence by defense counsel. 
2. The District Court Erred In Denvinq Mr. Cantrell's Motion To Suppress 
Based On Belton's Search Incident To Arrest Rule 
In denying Mr. Cantrell's motion to suppress, the district court held that "An 
officer may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle contemporaneously with the 
lawful arrest of its occupant, including searching any containers in it, even though the 
occupant has been arrested and placed in a patrol car." (R., pp.92-93 (citing New 
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).) The district court concluded, "Officer White's 
search of the passenger compartment revealed the Tupperware container of marijuana. 
There is no basis for the suppression of the evidence seized from the passenger 
compartment." (R., p.93.) Pursuant to Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (April 21, 
2009), Mr. Cantrell asserts that the district court erred in failing to suppress the 
marijuana found under the front seat, and the ultimate fruit of that illegal conduct, the 
marijuana found in the trunk of the car. See Wong Sun v. United Sfates, 371 U.S. 471 
(1 963). 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[tlhe right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV; ldaho Const. Art. I, 9 17. "Warrantless searches are 
presumptively unreasonable and the State bears the burden to demonstrate that a 
warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances." State v. Martinez, 
129 ldaho 426, 431, 925 P.2d 1125, 1130 (Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted). 
Accordingly, "searches and seizures 'conducted outside the judicial process, without 
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated 
exceptions."' Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993) (quoting Thompson v. 
Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1 984)). 
The United States Supreme Court has held that when evidence is obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually 
precludes its use in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and 
seizure. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)). 
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the United States Supreme Court 
first recognized that when a lawful custodial arrest occurs, it is reasonable for officers to 
search the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control, for two reasons: 
1) to remove any weapons that might be used to harm the officer(s) or effectuate the 
arrestee's escape; and, 2) to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence. 
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-763. Following Chimel, the Court then had an opportunity to 
address the search incident to arrest rule and its application to the arrest of individuals 
driving motor vehicles. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
In Belfon, a single New York State trooper, pulled over a speeding automobile. 
Id. at 455. The vehicle was occupied by four individuals including Mr. Belton. Id. The 
trooper discovered that none of the men owned the vehicle and none were related to 
the owner. Id. The trooper smelled burnt marijuana and saw on the floor of the vehicle 
an envelope marked "Supergold," which the trooper associated with marijuana. Id. 453 
U.S. at 455-456. The officer placed all four men under arrest, patted them each down, 
and placed them in four separate areas of the road so that they would not be in physical 
touching proximity to each other. Id. 453 U.S. at 456. He picked up the envelope, 
found that it contained marijuana, and gave each defendant the warnings required by 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Id. The trooper then searched each 
defendant and searched the passenger compartment of the automobile. Id. On the 
back seat, the trooper found a black leather jacket belonging to Belton, unzipped one of 
the pockets, and discovered cocaine. Id. The trooper drove the arrestees to a nearby 
station. Id. In reaching its decision, the Belton Court applied the "search incident to 
arrest" exception to the warrant requirement, previously articulated in Chimel. 
The Court attempted to define Chimers "area within the immediate control of the 
arrestee" language, in the context of the arrest of a recent occupant of an automobile, 
by creating a "bright line rule" wherein the Court found that "articles inside the relatively 
narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, 
even if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab 
a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]."' Belfon, 453 U.S. at 460 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 
763). The Belton Court ultimately held that, "when a policeman has made a lawful 
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous 
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." Id. at 
460. 
Recently, in Gant, the United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to 
reassess the Belton rule. In Gant, the defendant was arrested for driving on a 
suspended license. Id. 129 S.Ct. at 1715. Gant was handcuffed and locked in a police 
cruiser while officers searched his vehicle, locating a gun and a bag of cocaine in the 
pocket of a jacket in the backseat. Id. Citing to Justice O'Conner's opinion in 
Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 620, 631 (2004), the Gant Court found it 
troubling that "'lower court decisions seem to now treat the ability to search a vehicle 
incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an 
exception justified by the twin rationales of Chimel."' Id. at 1718 (quoting Thornton, 541 
U.S. at 624 (Justice O'Conner concurring in part)). The Gant Court rejected such a 
broad reading of Belton and held that "the Chime1 rationale authorizes police to search a 
vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and 
within reaching distance of the passenger compartmenf af fhe fime of  fhe search." Id. at 
1719 (emphasis added). Next, the Court concluded that there may be circumstances 
unique to the vehicle context where an officer may search a vehicle incident to arrest 
"when it is 'reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found 
in the vehicle."' Id (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632). However, the Court observed 
that "In many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there 
will be no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence" unlike 
both Belfon and Thornfon. Id. 
In the instant case, in justifying the warrantless search of Mr. Cantrell's vehicle, 
the district court employed the broad reading of Belton specifically criticized by the Gant 
Court and permitted the search of the vehicle incident to arrest. Moreover, neither of 
the exceptions articulated by the Gant Court, are applicable here. First of all, the State 
failed to offer any evidence, nor is there any evidence in the record, that Mr. Cantrell, or 
any of the occupants of the vehicle were an immediate threat to Officers White and 
Johnson. Officer White testified that Mr. Cantrell was cooperative throughout the 
officer's encounter with him. (Tr., p.82, Ls.4-6.); See also Stafe v. Henage, 143 Idaho 
655, 152 P.3d 16 (2007) (recognizing that defendant who was "polite and cooperative" 
did not pose a threat to officers). Not only was Mr. Cantrell cooperative with officers, 
but he was handcuffed and locked in the police car during the search, as the defendant 
was in Ganf. (Tr., p.45, Ls.3-7.) Additionally, the State did not offer any evidence that 
any of the remaining passengers were in anyway threatening. 
Moreover, unlike in both Belton and Thornfon, where the officers arrested the 
occupants for possession of an illegal substance, and therefore had reason to believe 
they would discover additional narcotics in the vehicle, Mr. Cantrell was arrested for a 
suspected traffic violation, driving under the influence of alcohol. See Belfon, 453 U.S. 
at 455-456, Thornfon, 541 U.S. at 61. Here, evidence of Mr. Cantrell's DUI offense 
would be the presence of alcohol in his system exceeding .08 BAC. Such evidence is 
contained within Mr. Cantrell's body, not his vehicle, and the only means of destroying 
such evidence is through the body's own natural metabolization and dissipation 
processes. 
Thus, it would not be reasonable to search a vehicle for evidence of DUI. The 
only possible evidence of DUI to be gained from a vehicle search would be an open 
container of alcohol, a separate offense from DUI, which does not logically and 
necessarily follow from a DUI offense (i.e. a DUI offense does not require an offender to 
have an open container in his or her vehicle) in the absence of some additional 
evidence that the driver was consuming alcohol in the vehicle. This is particularly true 
in Mr. Cantrell's case, where he admitted consuming alcohol, but ceased his 
consumption hours before getting into his vehicle. (See Tr., p.37, Ls.3-16.) 
Accordingly, because Officer White's discovery of the marijuana under the front seat 
stems from the unconstitutional search of the vehicle, the district court erred in not 
suppressing it. 
Following the discovery of the marijuana, Officer White then questioned 
Mr. Cantrell, causing Mr. Cantrell to divulge that there was a "bong" in his trunk, 
possibly providing the officer with probable cause to search the trunk. Thus, the 
discovery of the marijuana in the trunk was directly connected to the Officer White's 
unconstitutional search and should also be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1 963). 
3. The District Court Erred In Alternatively Applvinq The Inevitable Discovery 
Doctrine To Justify The Warrantless Search Of Mr. Cantrell's Vehicle And 
Discoverv Of Marijuana 
In the alternative, in denying Mr. Cantrell's motion to suppress, the district court 
concluded that the marijuana would have been inevitably discovered. (R., p.95.) It 
stated: 
The bulk of the marijuana was found in the trunk. By the time it was 
found, the defendant was already in custody for Driving Under the 
Influence and for Possession of Marijuana. His car was going to be 
impounded. It was searched as part of the impounding process. Under 
these circumstances, the discovery of the additional marijuana was 
inevitable. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 104 S. Ct. 
2501 (1984). Inventory [are] searches designed to protect a suspect from 
loss of property in impounded vehicles and the police from unfounded 
claims for lost property after taking lawful custody of a vehicle are valid 
even though there may also be an investigative purpose for the search. 
State V. Bray, 122 Idaho 375, 834 P.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1992); United 
States v. Penn, 233 F.3d 11 11 (gth Cir. 2000). 
(R., p.95.) Mr. Cantrell asserts that the State failed to meet its burden to prove that 
impounding the vehicle was proper in the instant case, that the Boise Police Department 
was uniformly following established criteria for impounding vehicles, and failed to 
demonstrate the that Boise Police Department has standardized procedures in place for 
the inventory searches of impounded vehicles. 
a. The State Failed To Meet Its Burden To Show That Impoundment 
Was Reasonable Because It Did Not Make A Showina Of Uniform 
Criteria For The lmpoundment Of A Vehicle 
"Although inventory searches of impounded vehicles' contents constitute an 
exception to the warrant requirement, an inventory search is not valid unless the police 
first obtain lawful possession of the vehicle." State v. Foster, 127 Idaho 723, 905 P.2d 
1032 (Ct. App. 1995). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that it is not 
unconstitutional for a police officer to exercise discretion in determining whether to 
impound a vehicle "so long as that discretion according to standard criteria and on the 
basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity." See 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1 987). 
Here, Mr. Cantrell asserts that the State failed to meet its burden to show that 
Officer White's decision to impound Mr. Cantrell's car was a discretionary decision 
based upon standardized criteria that is uniformly followed. During the suppression 
hearing, Officer White testified he asked Officer Johnson to call for a tow truck based on 
a "policy that's in transition right now of being written." (Tr., p.45, Ls.12-21.) Officer 
White continued: 
The direction that we have been given is if a driver has been arrested for a 
DUI, that we impound the vehicle with some guidelines. If you felt that the 
driver was from, what I understand, close, that we would leave the vehicle 
placed at the time of the stop, but other than that, we would impound the 
vehicle for public safety, as well as for protection of the department. 
(Tr., p.46, Ls.6-14.) Officer White then clarified the term "close" as "[bleing close to the 
alcohol limit." (Tr., p.46, Ls.15-18.) 
Mr. Cantrell asserts that the State failed to meet its burden to show that Officer 
White was operating under standard criteria that is routinely followed. First of all, as 
Officer White acknowledged, the policy he was operating under was "in transition" and 
in the process of being written. Moreover, according to Officer White, the policy is only 
employed by member of the "night STEP team" and is apparently not employed by other 
officers within the department. Finally, as defense counsel's offer of proof sought to 
show, it is not a policy that is uniformly followed. Rather, it seems to be followed based 
on the individual officers subjective whim, where some officers will impound some 
vehicles, while other officers will leave the vehicle be or allow the vehicle to be moved 
through other means. See State v. Weaver, 127 ldaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 
(1995) (holding that impoundment was unreasonable in part, because the passenger 
and owner of the vehicle was able to drive the vehicle); Fosfer, 127 ldaho at 727, 905 
P.2d at 1036 (quoting State v. Hobson, 95 ldaho 920, 925, 523 P.2d 523, 528 (1974) 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I ,  22 (1 968))) ("If subjective good faith alone were the 
test [for a seizure], the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the 
people would be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,' only in the 
discretion of the police.") 
b. lmpoundment Of The Vehicle Was llleaal In This Case Because 
The State Failed To Meet Its Burden To Show That The 
lmpoundment Was Reasonable 
The question of when impoundment is appropriate was addressed in Foster, 
supra. In that case, the ldaho Court of Appeals observed that impoundment of a vehicle 
implicates the Fourth Amendment because it constitutes a seizure of that automobile. 
Id. at 727, 905 P.2d at 1036. It then turned to Terry v. Ohio, supra, for an examination 
of the standard to be applied in determining whether a seizure is appropriate: 
[Tlhe officer's conduct must be judged against an "Objective 
standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the 
seizure or search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that 
the action taken was appropriate? [Citations omitted]. Anything less 
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on 
nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches. . . . [Citations 
omitted]. And simple 'good faith on the part of the . . . officer is not 
enough' . . . 
If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be 'secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects,' only in the discretion of the 
police. 
Id. (quoting Hobson, 95 ldaho at 925, 523 P.2d at 528 (1974) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 22)) (alterations as they appear in Fosfer). Proving that the impoundment was 
reasonable, of course, is the burden of the State. Foster, 127 ldaho at 727-28, 905 
P.2d at 1036-37; see also Sfafe v. Weaver, 127 ldaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 
(1995) ("The burden of proof rests with the State to demonstrate that the search either 
fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise 
reasonable under the circumstances."). 
Apparently using this standard, ldaho Supreme Court held in Weaver that it was 
unreasonable for police to impound a vehicle where the owner of the vehicle, although 
elderly and quite unsteady on her feet, was present and willing to take possession of 
that vehicle when its driver was arrested. Weaver, 127 ldaho at 291-92, 900 P.2d at 
199-200. Because it was Kootenai County Sheriffs Department policy not to impound a 
vehicle where the owner of the vehicle was not under arrest, had a valid driver's license, 
and was capable of driving, the Court reversed the order denying the motion to 
suppress. Id. Just months later, in Foster, the Court of Appeals held similarly. It held 
that where the driver's car was parked in an acquaintance's driveway, and it was not 
parked illegally, did not interfere with traffic, and showed no evidence of having been 
stolen or abandoned, police were unreasonable in impounding that vehicle. Foster, 127 
ldaho at 727-28, 905 P.2d at 1036-37. 
Here, all we know about the unwritten policy of the Boise Police Department is 
that in some cases with DUI, the officer will choose to impound the vehicle, but in other 
cases, possibly under the same set of circumstances, the officer will make the decision 
not to impound the vehicle. (Tr., p.74, L.21 - p.76, L.20.) It is apparent in the record 
that there were three other occupants in the vehicle that could have possibly taken 
possession of it. (Tr., p.34, Ls.10-23.) A warrantless search is per se unreasonable 
and the State has the heavy burden to justify its actions. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 
U.S. 366, 372 (1993). By failing to make a reasonable inquiry as to the availability any 
of the passengers to take possession of the vehicle, much less having a policy for the 
impoundment of vehicles that is routinely followed, the State's impoundment of this 
vehicle is presumptively unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Because the impoundment of the vehicle was improper in this case, the fruits of 
any subsequent "inventory" search should have been suppressed. Weaver, 127 ldaho 
at 291, 900 P.2d at 199. 
c. Even If Impoundment Of The Vehicle Was Lesal, The 
Accompanying "Inventory" Search Was Illeaal Because The State 
Failed To Demonstrate That The Boise Police Department Has In 
Place Standardized Procedures For lnventorv Searches Of 
Impounded Vehicles 
Assuming arguendo that the impoundment of the vehicle was proper, the police 
were nevertheless remiss in the conduct of their so-called "inventory" search. As set 
forth below, the State failed to make any showing that the Boise Police Department had 
a standard procedure for conducting inventory prior to impounding the vehicle or would 
have followed a standard policy for conducting inventory searches on the vehicles it 
impounds. 
As discussed above, the burden is on the police to "demonstrate that the search 
either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was 
otherwise reasonable under the circumstances." Weaver, 127 ldaho at 290, 900 P.2d 
at 198. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the State to demonstrate that the police 
department in question has standardized criteria for conducting inventory searches. Ex 
Parfe Boyd, 542 So.2d 1276, 1281-83 (Ala. 1989). 
In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-369 (1976), the United States 
Supreme Court approved of police departments' "community caretaking function" of 
removing automobiles from streets and highways to improve the flow of traffic and 
protect the public. It then went on to hold that, in certain circumstances, police can 
inventory the contents of the vehicles they impound in order to: (a) protect the owner's 
property from theft or vandalism, (b) immunize the police department from claims and 
disputes arising out of stolen or damaged property, and (c) protect individual police 
officers from dangerous items that may be inside impounded vehicles. Id. at 369, 372. 
The probable cause requirements necessary for a search warrant are inapplicable to 
analysis of a valid inventory search. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371; State v. Bray, 122 ldaho 
375, 379, 834 P.2d 892, 896 (Ct. App. 1992). 
To satisfy the Fourth Amendment, reasonable, standardized criteria or 
established routine must regulate inventory searches generally, and such criteria must 
specifically regulate the opening of closed containers found during an inventory search. 
Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 1 10 S. Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1 990) Bertine, 479 U .S. 
at 375, Foster, 127 ldaho at 726, 905 P.2d at 1035; Bray, 122 ldaho at 378-379, 834 
P.2d at 895-896. As stated in Wells: 
Our view that standardized criteria ... or established routine ... must 
regulate the opening of containers found during inventory searches is 
based on the principle that an inventory search must not be a ruse for a 
general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence. The policy 
or practice governing inventory searches should be designed to produce 
an inventory. The individual police officer must not be allowed so much 
latitude that inventory searches are turned into a "purposeful and general 
means of discovering evidence of crime. 
Wells, 495 U.S. at 4 (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376). In determining if an inventory 
procedure is reasonable, the court must balance the government's interest in performing 
its legitimate caretaking functions against the Fourth Amendment interest the individual 
has in the property subject to inventory. Illinois v. Lafayefte, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983); 
Bray, 122 ldaho at 379, 834 P.2d at 896. Nothing prohibits the exercise of police 
discretion in opening containers found during inventory searches, so long as the 
discretion is exercised according to the standard criteria. Wells, 495 U.S. at 3-4. 
Therefore, a policy or standard criteria allowing officer discretion to determine if a 
container should be opened, depending on the nature of both the search and the 
container, satisfies the Fourth Amendment just as would policies of opening all 
containers or of opening no containers. Id., at 4. 
In Wells, a police officer opened a locked container found inside an impounded 
vehicle during an inventory search of the vehicle contents in the total absence of any 
department policy regarding the opening of locked containers. The United States 
Supreme Court held that, because the police department had no policy regarding locked 
containers found during the course of an inventory search, the search of the locked 
container in that case was not sufficiently regulated to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. 
Id., at 4-5. 
As was made abundantly clear in both Opperman and Bertine, reasonable 
standardized procedures are the key to legitimizing inventory searches because 
standard procedures ensure that such searches are used for their protective purposes, 
not for investigative purposes. Moreover, in Boyd v. State, 542 So.2d 1276 (Ala. 1989), 
the Alabama Supreme Court read the standardized procedures requirement strictly. In 
that case, even though the prosecution presented testimonial evidence that 
"standardized procedures were followed," the court held that the State nevertheless 
failed to meet its burden of proving scrupulous compliance with a standardized 
procedure. Boyd, 542 So.2d at 1281-83. It held that it could "not determine whether the 
regulations of the Anniston Police Department relating to inventory searches are 
'reasonable,' or whether the police acted in accord with 'standard criteria,"' because 
"there was no testimony whatsoever that provided the particulars of the policy." Id. at 
1281-82 (emphasis added). Ultimately, it held, "[wlithout such proof, the search is 
constitutionally defective." Id. at 1282. 
The State has not met its burden to justify the search at the time of arrest, or later 
after the vehicle is impounded, as it failed to make any showing that the Boise Police 
Department had a standard procedure for conducting inventory prior to impounding the 
vehicle or would have followed a standard policy for conducting inventory searches on 
the vehicles it impounded. There is nothing in the record that establishes reasonable, 
standardized criteria or established routine which must regulate inventory searches 
generally, and especially such criteria that must specifically regulate the opening of 
closed containers found during an inventory search. There is no written policy 
concerning inventory searches in the record and the State did not offer any testimony as 
to an inventory policy followed at the time of arrest or after a vehicle is impounded. 
Finally, this case involved the search of a Tupperwear container under the front seat 
and bag inside the trunk of the vehicle, which requires criteria that must specifically 
regulate the opening of closed containers found during an inventory search. Florida v. 
Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 1 I 0  S. Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375; 
Foster, 127 ldaho at 726, 905 P.2d at 1035; and Bray, 122 ldaho at 378-379, 834 P.2d 
at 895-896. 
The record shows that there is no evidence of any specific criteria for opening a 
container found during an inventory search. In order to justify the search at the time of 
the arrest, or any prospective inventory search under the inevitable discovery doctrine, 
the State has the burden to prove that a standard policy exists and was followed in this 
case. Because the State failed to meet its burden, the district court's order denying 
Mr. Cantrell's motion to suppress must be reversed. 
For all of the reasons articulated above, Mr. Cantrell asserts that the district court 
erred when it denied his motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cantrell respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 3oth day of June, 2009. 
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